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Epidemiology of SARS in the 2003 
Hong Kong epidemic
Key Messages
1. The temporal and spatial 
evolution of the SARS epidemic 
in Hong Kong is described.
2. Estimates of key 
epidemiological distributions 
and their stability over the 
course of the epidemic are 
derived.
3. The characteristics of those 
who contracted the disease are 
determined including factors 
associated with the likelihood of 
mortality as a result of SARS-
coronavirus infection.
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Introduction
The SARS epidemic was the first communicable disease epidemic of the 
21st century, with 29 countries affected. The first human case was identified 
in Guangdong, China on 16 November 2002 and the last known case had 
a symptom onset date of 5 July 2003 in Taiwan. The disease infected 8098 
individuals of whom 774 died.1,2 Hong Kong bore a large proportion of this 
morbidity and mortality burden, and was the link between cases in China and 
other parts of the world. Of 1755 cases, 299 deaths occurred from 15 February 
to 31 May 2003. 
 To formulate public health policy, an account of the epidemiology of SARS 
in Hong Kong was undertaken during the outbreak.3 The dataset has since been 
updated using information from all 1755 reported cases. Relaxation of parametric 
assumptions was allowed in the mid-epidemic analysis, in the analysis of the 
interval from symptoms to admission, admission to death, and admission to 
discharge. Furthermore, complete case data enabled analysis of predictors of 
SARS-related mortality using logistic regression. 
Aims and objectives
To generate and delineate the definitive epidemiological parameters of SARS-
CoV, using the complete case-contact data from the 2003 Hong Kong outbreak.
Methods
Sources of data
We analysed an integrated database (SARSID) derived from the Hong Kong 
Hospital Authority eSARS system (a secure web-based data repository containing 
mostly real-time clinical data). Some data fields were collected/confirmed 
retrospectively via a detailed chart review (according to a standardised protocol 
by trained nurses) and the Department of Health’s Master List (consisting mostly 
of questionnaires of case and case-contact data). The latter contained details on 
all SARS patients admitted to hospitals in Hong Kong throughout the entire 
epidemic. The questionnaires (exploring case and case-contact information) 
were administered, mostly through telephone interviews, with all SARS patients 
(in whom the diagnosis were confirmed by the Department of Health). The 
interviews were conducted mostly within 3 days (up to a maximum of 1 week) of 
the initial presentation. For patients who could not be contacted or were too ill to 
be interviewed or dead, proxy reporting was obtained from an immediate family 
member most familiar with the medical and contact history of the patients before 
infection. Data on case and contact information were collected on all 1755 SARS 
patients, although not all data elements were completed for all cases. 
 Laboratory confirmation of SARS was by: (1) reverse transcription–
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) for SARS-CoV and (2) serological testing 
for IgG against SARS-CoV. Patients were considered to have laboratory-
confirmed SARS if there was: (1) a positive RT-PCR result from two or more 
clinical specimens, either from different sites or tested in different laboratories, 
obtained either from live patients or post-mortem; or (2) seroconversion by 
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ELISA, immunofluorescence assay (IFA) or neutralisation 
assay. Paired samples for serological testing were collected 
at least 21 to 28 days apart. All specimens were carried out 
in three designated laboratories (The Chinese University 
of Hong Kong, The University of Hong Kong, and the 
Department of Health) where rigorous quality control 
procedures were in place. 
Statistical analysis
The epidemic time series of all 1755 local cases was 
constructed based on the date of symptom onset and infection 
cluster. Infection clusters were classified by probable 
transmission setting (institutional vs community), location 
(eg housing estates), occupation (eg health care workers) 
and workplace (eg hospitals). The age and sex distributions 
of SARS patients were compared with general population 
estimates derived from the 2001 population census. 
 To illustrate the geospatial pattern of disease spread, 
we used a geographic information system (ArcGIS and its 
extension modules) to construct a map of infection clusters 
in different districts of Hong Kong. 
 Empirical distributions were plotted for intervals from 
onset to admission, onset to death, and onset to discharge, 
and the mean and variance of these distributions calculated. 
The database contained 81 patients with one exposure to a 
confirmed SARS patient within 15 days (with start and end 
dates recorded), no travel and who were not hospitalised 
prior to the onset of symptoms. The relationship between 
the onset-to-discharge interval and patient age was tested 
by linear regression. A model was fitted to the onset-to-
admission interval, with onset category as the independent 
variable. In addition, the sex-specific linear relationships 
between age and the variability of the onset-to-discharge 
and onset-to-death intervals were examined by modelling 
the standard deviation as a linear function in age. The 
resulting model was solved by the maximum likelihood 
method.
 Logistic regression was used to identify factors 
significantly associated with fatality due to SARS. The 
following variables were tested in the model: age, sex, 
occupation (health care worker vs others), symptoms 
on presentation (typical vs atypical), infection cluster, 
calendar period of infection (as defined by the symptom 
onset date, interval from onset to admission), presence of 
pre-existing co-morbidities (including asthma, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, cardiovascular disease, 
cerebrovascular disease, cancer, diabetes mellitus, chronic 
renal disease, and chronic liver disease). The ratio of the 
lactate dehydrogenase level to the upper normal limit was 
used as an indicator of disease severity on admission, and 
the number of days between the onset of symptoms and 
initiation of ribavirin. We used indicator variables to denote 
missing items for variables that did not have complete 
data coverage, ie atypical symptoms, infection cluster, and 
lactate dehydrogenase level. 
 Probability of survival/mortality curves were plotted 
(stratified by age) to illustrate the dependence of time-to-
death for those who died. All analyses were repeated on the 
1467 patients with laboratory confirmation of SARS. All 
statistical analyses were carried out on STATA version 8.0.
Results
Laboratory confirmation of SARS status
Of the 1755 SARS patients, 1467 (83.6%) were confirmed 
by laboratory: 447 seroconverted and had two or more 
positive RT-PCR results, 959 seroconverted only, and 61 had 
two or more positive RT-PCR results only. In 288 patients, 
laboratory confirmation was not possible for various 
reasons, including inadequate or insufficient specimens 
(n=199), negative RT-PCR and/or serology results (n=89).
Time
The patient who initiated the largest transmission chain in 
Hong Kong and the global outbreak was from Guangdong 
province. He first had symptoms on 15 February 2003 and 
was admitted to hospital on 22 February 2003, one day after 
arriving in Hong Kong.4 The development of the epidemic 
featured a period of exponential growth, beginning on 10 
March 2003, which was further exacerbated by transmission 
not related to intimate personal contact (in the Amoy 
Gardens estate and immediate neighbourhood).4 This was 
followed by a period of comparative stability throughout 
early to mid April, with a declining trend beginning in the 
week of 22 April 2003. The last case had symptoms onset 
on 31 May 2003 and was admitted to hospital on 2 June 
2003. 
Place
About 49% of SARS patients were infected in clinics, 
hospitals or elderly/nursing homes. The superspreading 
event in Amoy Gardens resulted in a daily incidence of close 
to 100 at the height of the outbreak in late March. Spread 
within residential buildings accounted for 22% of all cases, 
mostly at Amoy Gardens. An additional 7% of all cases 
were classified as ‘near to Amoy Gardens’. This referred 
to SARS patients living in the immediate neighbourhood 
of Amoy Gardens, who were believed to be linked to the 
main Amoy Gardens cluster, but not themselves residents 
of that housing estate. About 5% of Hong Kong cases 
were imported (or re-imported) from overseas or from air 
travel. Fewer than 10% resulted from transmission in the 
general community including household settings (aside 
from the superspreading event in Amoy Gardens). Of 
these, 64% (97/152) could be attributed to intra-familial 
or within-household spread (defined as transmission from 
one household or family member to another with no other 
known sources of an infectious contact).
 There was clear clustering of cases in certain districts 
of the Kowloon peninsula (Kwun Tong in which Amoy 
Gardens is located) and the New Territories (Shatin and 
Tai Po districts where the Prince of Wales and Alice Ho 
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Mui Ling Nethersole Hospitals, sites of large nosocomial 
outbreaks, are located respectively), but Hong Kong Island 
was relatively spared. Clustering became apparent as the 
epidemic unfolded, with per capita incidence varying 
significantly between districts.3
People
The female/male ratio among infected patients was 1.26. 
Compared to the age and sex distribution of the Hong 
Kong general population, there was a clear excess of young 
adults, especially females (102 out of the 254 female SARS 
patients aged 25 to 34 years were nurses). Moreover, there 
was a relative deficit of children and adolescents. Elderly 
men (>75 years old) were over-represented among SARS 
patients, as were elderly women despite to a lesser extent. 
Health care workers accounted for 23% of all infected 
persons; most of them worked in the public sector, where 
SARS patients were mainly cared for (in 14 designated 
centres). Some patients were initially admitted to other 
hospitals but later transferred. Nurses accounted for 52% 
of the 405 health care workers infected, followed by health 
care assistants such as orderlies (28%) and medical doctors 
(16%).
Key epidemiological parameters
The estimated mean and variance of the incubation period 
was 4.6 and 15.9 days, respectively2; 95% of patients had 
the onset of symptoms within 12.5 days of infection. 
 Onset and admission times are both observable events. 
Patients were grouped by the week of clinical onset, and 11 
time-periods were analysed. There were too few patients 
with symptom onset before 15 February 2003 for robust 
analysis. According to a biphasic linear model, the interval 
from symptom onset to admission decreased significantly 
during the first 5 weeks (P<0.001), but not over the last 6 
weeks (P=0.27). 
 The respective mean and variance of the interval from 
symptom onset to death were 23.7 and 221.0 days, and for 
the interval from symptom onset to discharge were 26.5 
and 194.9 days.2 There was substantial variability in the 
distribution of these two intervals, with greater variance 
observed for the former. The variability decreased with age 
for the former (P=0.027), whereas the opposite was true for 
the latter (P<0.001). The symptom onset-to-death intervals 
varied significantly according to patient age, demonstrating 
an inverted U-shaped relationship, where those aged 50 to 
59 years (especially females) had the longest mean intervals 
and those aged >70 years had comparatively briefer periods 
of illness before death. In contrast, older patients who 
survived were usually discharged later and this relationship 
appeared to be linearly related to age (P<0.001).
Case fatality ratios and associated predictors
The overall case fatality ratio was 17% (299 deaths out 
of 1755 SARS cases). Survival was heavily influenced by 
both age and sex. Male SARS patients had a 50% (95% 
CI=7-109%) excess risk of death. Mortality increased 
significantly with age (P<0.001). For example, none 
of the female patients <30 years old died, compared to 
approximately 75% of males aged >70 years died. A lower 
case fatality was associated with health care worker status 
(adjusted odds ratio [OR]=0.35; 95% CI, 0.15-0.80). The 
minority of individuals presenting with atypical symptoms 
(3%) had a significantly increased risk of death (adjusted 
OR=2.62; 95% CI, 1.24-5.53). Similarly, the presence of 
pre-existing co-morbidities and greater disease severity 
(as inferred from higher lactate dehydrogenase levels on 
admission) increased the risk of death. The calendar time-
period during which patients fell ill was not significantly 
associated with survival, nor was earlier admission after the 
symptom onset, or the timing of ribavirin administration. 
The precise infection cluster that a patient belonged to was 
not a significant predictor (at the 0.05 level).
 Analyses based on the subset of 1467 patients with 
laboratory confirmation of SARS produced similar results 
to those of the full cohort. However, health care worker 
status (adjusted OR=0.64; 95% CI, 0.26-1.56) and atypical 
symptoms (adjusted OR=2.06; 95% CI, 0.83-5.11) were 
no longer significantly associated with survival at the 0.05 
level for this subset of patients. We believe that the full 
1755 cohort should remain the main results partly because 
199 out of 288 non-laboratory confirmed cases did not 
have adequate or sufficient clinical specimens to be tested. 
Nonetheless, they fulfilled clinical and epidemiological 
criteria for the diagnosis of SARS prior to laboratory testing. 
This is different from the scenario where results of both RT-
PCR and serological tests were negative. Additionally, we 
examined the influence of missing data on the stability of 
the logistic regression models (ie both the 1755 and 1467 
models) through a series of sensitivity analyses. The two 
variables with the most numbers of missing values, namely 
atypical symptoms (missing items=273, 16%) and lactate 
dehydrogenase level on admission (missing items=242, 
14%), were excluded from the regression model. The results 
were robust even after deletion of these two variables, 
as they achieved significance as well as directionality 
and magnitude of associations. Moreover, after multiple 
imputation to deal with missing data for these two variables, 
the regression results were again very similar to the baseline 
model.
Discussion 
Our findings provide a summary of the time-course and 
patient location of the 2003 Hong Kong SARS outbreak 
and the characteristics of those infected. The time-course 
of the epidemic was marked by an initial period of 
exponential growth and a decline after 6 weeks of intensive 
public health control measures. Significant geospatial 
clustering was observed, with several large clusters of 
SARS cases in hospitals and residential settings and a high 
proportion of health care workers. These observations are 
largely consistent with those reported for the Singapore 
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and Toronto outbreaks, where the hospital environment 
substantially amplified the risk of infection.5-7 The pattern 
of infection clusters also suggests that the viral infection 
is of low transmissibility, except in settings of intimate 
contact or where significant environmental contamination 
occurred. It may also suggest low infectivity for some days 
following the onset of clinical symptoms. In addition, the 
risk of acquiring the infection varied significantly according 
to age, with relatively few cases and no deaths in children 
and adolescents. The reasons for this remain unclear. 
 One of the key aspects of infection control introduced 
during the epidemic was a policy of quarantine, where 
individuals who were possibly infected or had contact 
with known SARS cases were isolated for a fixed period. 
Definition of this period was informed by timely estimates of 
the time from exposure to first symptoms, ie the incubation 
period distribution. The analyses of the full dataset indicated 
that 13 days may be necessary to capture 95% of all possible 
cases,2,8 compared to a period of 10 days recommended by 
the World Health Organization and US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. Yet our estimation procedure 
adopted a parametric gamma distribution and thus 
implicitly assumed the possibility of very long incubation 
periods. In addition, owing to methodological constraints, 
this distribution was fitted to data on a very small subset 
of cases with a single exposure source with known start 
and end dates, and therefore the generalisability of these 
findings to the whole sample was unknown. 
 The analysis of the onset-to-admission interval showed 
a progressive shortening of the interval from the onset of 
symptoms to presentation at hospital, likely due to heightened 
community awareness and a high index of suspicion among 
health care providers as the epidemic spread.9 Coupled with 
the observation that SARS almost exclusively manifested 
as a florid clinical syndrome requiring inpatient treatment 
and rarely as a subclinical or mild infection (ie with no 
asymptomatic carriers of the disease), it was possible to 
reduce the onset-to-admission interval to a minimum (ie 2 
days) and this might be an effective public health control 
measure. It was relatively easy for those infected to recognise 
their illness and promptly present to the health care system. 
This enabled rapid isolation of infectious individuals, hence 
reducing the effective infectious period and thus the risk 
of onward transmission. However, shortening the time 
between first symptoms and the initiation of treatment 
after hospital admission did not appear to increase the 
probability of survival. Clinical studies of the typical 
course of infection in SARS-CoV patients suggested that 
the average peak infectiousness may occur 8 to 9 days after 
the onset of symptoms.10 This pattern, which is atypical for 
most respiratory or gastrointestinal tract infections, implies 
that prompt isolation after the onset of symptoms is a very 
effective public health measure for this particular infection. 
This observation also helps to explain the large fraction of 
cases that occurred in health care workers in Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Taipei and Toronto, since they had contact with 
patients during their peak infectious phase.
 The distributions of onset-to-death and onset-to-discharge 
intervals add information to the natural history of the disease 
process (mostly among treated patients) and underline the 
importance of patient age and sex in determining the course 
of illness. They also allow clinicians to understand the 
relative distributions of time to clinical outcomes, so that 
this SARS outbreak can be compared to future outbreaks 
should they occur. The lower mean and variability in the 
symptom onset-to-death interval distribution among the 
deceased elderly was likely due to their relative frailty and 
higher prevalence of co-morbidities. Whereas factors such 
as post-SARS disability and treatment complications might 
have led to a longer hospital stay for elderly survivors; some 
of these patients were hospitalised for treatment of other 
diseases after recovery from SARS. The modal peak of the 
symptom onset-to-discharge interval distribution of 21 days 
was, to an extent, an artefact of administrative guidelines, 
namely a minimum 21 days of hospitalisation, which had 
been in effect since early April 2003.
 The estimation of epidemiological parameters and case 
fatality ratios during an ongoing epidemic is complicated 
by the open cohort problem of censoring, such that it 
is impossible to ascertain who will eventually die or be 
discharged among those still hospitalised at the time of 
the analysis. This is further complicated by the temporal 
evolution of the epidemic with incident cases continually 
being added to the pool of infected individuals. In this 
analysis of all 1755 consecutive cases in Hong Kong, 
the outcome was observed in all cases and hence issues 
regarding censoring do not apply. 
 Although the overall case fatality ratio was 17%, this 
figure masks the significant variation in case fatality by 
age. Male gender, more severe illness on presentation 
as indicated by the lactate dehydrogenase level, and the 
presence of pre-existing co-morbidities were significantly 
associated with a high case fatality in the multivariable 
analysis. The timing of ribavirin administration did not 
significantly influence clinical outcome, possibly due to 
residual confounding or insufficient power to detect a 
difference given that most patients were treated. Previous 
analyses of case fatality predictors have only examined 
small, hospital-based datasets with limited information on a 
comprehensive range of personal and clinical variables, yet 
their findings were similar to the present study with respect 
to the effects of age, sex, co-morbidities and high lactate 
dehydrogenase levels on mortality. It should be noted 
that even in the largest case cohort in Hong Kong, there 
was insufficient statistical power to examine all important 
factors that might have influenced case fatality. 
 As our study demonstrated, the appropriate methodology 
to identify predictors of survival (or case fatality) is through a 
multivariable logistic regression model with a closed cohort. 
In the heat of a crisis, however, observational studies based 
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on amalgamated datasets from different clinical settings are 
the only means by which treatment value can be assessed. 
In drawing conclusions from such analyses, bias may be 
present in patient choice for any given treatment, and this 
must be taken into account.
Conclusions
Future research should closely examine the relative 
merits and drawbacks of different statistical approaches 
to estimating the distribution of incubation periods, since 
such estimates are central to public health and evolving 
an infection control policy. Quarantine times must take 
into account the extent of potential disruption to people’s 
lives and the likely degree of compliance in different 
communities.
 To clarify some of the unresolved issues raised in this 
report, more detailed analysis involving other relevant 
clinical factors, such recourse to non-invasive assisted 
ventilation or other medications and their timing, as well 
as longitudinal observations of clinical and laboratory 
parameters are needed.
 Public health authorities worldwide should formulate 
appropriately resourced protocols for randomised controlled 
trials to properly evaluate the efficacy of various management 
strategies should SARS recur. While SARS is unlikely to 
return as a large epidemic across many different countries, 
clinical investigators need to recognise the importance 
of multi-national, multi-centred epidemiological studies 
and collaboration. This should extend to clinical trials to 
increase the power to detect moderate effects of treatment 
regimens and associated risk factors.
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